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RICO Meets Keiretsu: A Response to
Predatory Transfer Pricing
James D. Harmon, Jr.*
ABSTRACT
Japanese cartels known as keiretsu pursue illegal transfer pricing policies which cost American taxpayers billions of dollars and place Ameri-

can businesses at a competitive disadvantage. Keiretsu-controlledsubsidiaries located in- the United States buy goods, financial products or

servicesfrom theirJapaneseparent atfraudulently inflated prices. Their
dual purpose is to create artificial business expenses and costs (thereby
reducing taxable income and paying little or no United States corporate
income tax) and to gain an edge on American businesses through tax
evasion.
Mr. Harmon proposes that American businesses respond to this problem with techniques normally used against organized crime. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) can combat the
anti-competitive market effects of keiretsu. When transfer pricing damages American businesses through tax evasion and money laundering,
* The author was the Executive Director and Chief Counsel of the President's Commission on Organized Crime during the Reagan Administration (1984-1986), is currently a partner in the New York law firm of Bower & Gardner and has successfully
argued before the United States Supreme Court B.S., United States Military Academy,
1965; J.D., Dickinson School of Law, 1971; L.L.M., New York University School of
Law, 1977.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Allen Hobbs of Bower & Gardner, B.A., Hamilton College, 1980; J.D., Vanderbilt University School of Law, 1987,
and Christopher R. Robbins, B.S., United States Military Academy, 1962; M.B.A.,
Harvard Business School, 1977, in the preparation of this article.
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RICO's treble damage provisions provide them with the means to recover
lost profits.
RICO provides a juridical approach to what has been treated as a
matter of international diplomacy. By offering a domestic legal solution
to curb corporate Japan's predatory trade practices, Mr. Harmon undertakes to neutralizeJapan'spowerful political resourcesand provide a
private remedy for harmful trade practices which the Government has
been unable to control.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Keiretsu, Japan's closed loop production and financial enterprises,

give Japanese business the advantage of an uneven playing field when
they do business in the United States. For the past several years, a debate has raged in the business community on what to do about it. For
example, Charles Ferguson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for Technology, Policy and Industrial Development argues
that keiretsu, engaging in "techno-industrial Prussianism,"' 1 have all but
caused United States manufacturers to lose the ten billion dollar world
semiconductor market.2 As a response, economist and author George
Gilder favors the trickle-up effect of American individualism combined
with new technology as a defense.3 Ferguson, however, rejects Gilder's
1. Charles H. Ferguson, America's High Tech Decline, 74 FOREIGN POL'Y 123, 140
(1989).
2. Charles H. Ferguson, Computers and the Coming of the U.S. Keiretsu, HARV.
Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1990, at 55, 56.
3. George Gilder, The Revitalization of Everything: The Law of the Microcosm,
HARV. Bus. REv.,,Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 49; see also GEORGE GILDER, MICROCOSM: THE
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faith in small entrepreneurial companies as an inadequate response to
the Japanese challenge to the computer industry. Labelling Gilder's
"law of the microcosm" as voodoo competitive doctrine, Ferguson proposes United States keiretsu, rather than individualism, as the answer.4
Silicon Valley innovators cannot agree either. T.J. Rodgers, CEO of
Cypress Semiconductor, endorses Gilder's ode to rugged entrepreneurialism. On the other hand, Robert Noyce, CEO of Sematech, the industry
and government-funded semiconductor research consortium, calls Rodgers' approach false hope and high-tech fiction. Noyce hopes for a "well
aimed light" to help American business find the way.5
As the debate continues, beseiged American business seems content
only to hope that American government subsidy or a change in government trade policy present a solution. IBM and Apple Computer seem a
notable exception. Their recently-announced research collaboration to
develop the personal computer for the 1990s may be a big step in Ferguson's direction, although IBMs recent reorganization plan, which counts
on innovation fostered through decentralization, seems to adopt the
Gilder/Rodgers' approach.6
Congressional lawmakers of all stripes have jumped on the bandwagon seizing the opportunity to bash foreign corporations as the cause
of everything from the budget deficit to higher taxes, but with little to
show for their tub-thumping.7
Meanwhile, virtually the entire American business lobby in Washington rails at the federal anti-racketeering statute known as the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)' pressuring Congress

QUANTUM REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY

(1989).

4. Charles H. Ferguson, From the People Who Brought You Voodoo Economics,
HARv. Bus. REV., May-Jun. 1988, at 55, 62.
5. T. J. Rodgers & Robert Noyce, Debating George Gilder's Microcosm: T.J. Rodgers vs. Robert Noyce, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 24, 36. T. J. Rodgers
practices what he preaches. Cypress Semiconductor is operated through a system of "perpetual entrepreneurship" in which semi-independent companies are spun off to design
and manufacture new products. Richard Brandt, The Bad Boy of Silicon Valley, Bus.
WK., Dec. 9, 1991, at 64-70.
6. It's Official: IBM and Apple Tie The Knot, Bus. WK., Oct. 14, 1991, at 54; John
W. Verity et al., The New IBM, Bus. WK., Dec. 16, 1991, at 112.
7. Limited congressional activity has focused on barring foreign investment and increasing reporting requirements. In 1988, 'as amended in 1990, Congress gave the President limited power to block foreign investment which threatened national security interests. The Omnibus Trade and Competition Act of 1988. Other bills introduced, but not
enacted, would have required foreign investors to make public filings with respect to
their United States based operations. H.R. 5, 101th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1989).
8. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-68 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
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to water it down to the point where it is so diluted that it loses its potency.' With typical shortsightedness, American business misses the
point that RICO could reverse the tide of keiretsu transfer pricing practices that cost the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) billions of dollars and
give Japanese companies a competitive advantage in certain American
markets. They should rethink their position on RICO. RICO is the
hammer that American business has been looking for, but now seems
prepared to throw away without even using.
II.

NEW RULES OF

ENGAGEMENT

This Article introduces into the debate a step-by-step plan of legal
action for American business to combat some of the market effects of
keiretsu, a key element of Japan Inc.'s industrial order of battle. It is
premised on viewing the problem from an American perspective and using a uniquely American approach now within the control of U.S. companies-hardnosed litigation on the scale of Godzilla meets King Kong.
The plan would be to seize the initiative and play by American rules
in United States markets, thus neutralizing the advantages of keiretsu
activity through means normally used to prosecute organized crime.
One word of caution-the approach advanced is only a solid counterattack intended to stabilize segments of certain industries. It would only
buy time for the resolution of the principles of Gilder and Ferguson,
both of whom seem to know what they are talking about. I cannot speak
with their authority on economic theory. But I do accept their mutual
premise that the martial nature of Japanese business methods poses a
real challenge, if not a threat, to American business if left unanswered.

III.

MODUS OPERANDI

Japanese keiretsu engage in cartel-like conduct characterized by supplier-buyer relationships impenetrable to American companies, by
groups of companies related financially, through mutual shareholding 0
and interlocking directorates, and by technological interdependence. Ri-

9. See H.R. 101-975, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 1717, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1991); S. 438, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
10. See, e.g., Kozo Yamamura, Will Japan'sEconomic Structure Change? Confessions of a Former Optimist, in JAPAN'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: SHOULD IT CHANGE?
13, 28-36 (Kozo Yamamura ed. 1990) [hereinafter JAPAN'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]; see

also John 0. Haley, Weak Law, Strong Competition, and Trade Barriers:Competitiveness as a Disincentive to Foreign Entry Into JapaneseMarkets, in JAPAN'S ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE, id., at 203, 213-24.
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valry is suppressed with the goal of displacing foreign competitors."
Keiretsu enterprises give Japanese firms some significant advantages, including easy access to low cost capital, a long term focus secured through
12
stable shareholding, and a captive market for their goods and services.
Organized crime infiltration of the financial arms of some keiretsu-an

idea once thought of as xenophobic drivel-no longer can be dismissed. 13

11. See, e.g., Giovanni Dosi et al., Trade, Technologies and Development: A Framework for DiscussingJapan, in POLITICS AND PRODUCTIVITY: THE REAL STORY OF
3, 32-34 (Chalmers Johnson et al. eds. 1989) [hereinafter POLITMichael Gerlach, Keiretsu Organization in the Japanese
Economy: Analysis and Trade Implications, in POLITICS AND PRODUCTIVITY, id., at
141.
WHY JAPAN WORKS

ICS AND PRODUCTIVITY];

12. Marie Anchordoguy, A Challenge to Free Trade?JapaneseIndustrial Targeting in the Computer and Semiconductor Industries, in JAPAN'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 10, at 301, 325-27.
13. Recently, the presidents of two major Japanese securities firms, Nomura Securities Co. and Nikko Securities Co., resigned after reports in the Japanese press that
Susumu Ishii, a retired leader of the Yakuza mob, made millions through these firms.
Karen L. Miller, Suddenly the JapaneseMob Is Out of the Shadows, Bus. WK., July 8,
1991, at 29. According to press accounts, affiliates of these firms and a bank loaned Ishii
about $300 million, which he used to purchase stock in a railway company whose stock
then appreciated as a result of questionable trading. This reaped huge profits to Ishii,
which were then illegally invested overseas. Ishii, who also reportedly purchased an interest in a Houston software company and a New York financial services company, made
about $287 million when Nikko and Nomura affiliates and others purchased worthless
golf club membership certificates from a club that Ishii owned. Id. In testimony before
Parliament, Nomura's former chairman testified that he could not remember who introduced Ishii to Nomura-an introduction that he had recalled until the day of his testimony. James Sterngold, Testimony On Brokers in Tokyo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1991 at
D6.
More recently, press reports have detailed how between one and three billion dollars
in loans from some of Japan's most prominent banks were funnelled through a trucking
company to Yakuza controlled businesses and to Japanese politicians. The loans to the

trucking company are said to be uncollectable. Another Scandal in Japan, This Time
Involving Billions, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1992, at D3.
The Yakuza does not operate in the shadows as does the Mafia. Instead, it chooses to
be a highly visible part of Japanese society earning annual revenues estimated at about
$10 billion and holding $3.6 billion of stock in legitimate companies. Miller, supra, at
29. Its techniques of corporate extortion include sokaiya, a form of blackmail whereby
Yakuza members intimidate board members at annual public shareholders meetings by
threatening to disclose damaging information about a company or its management. The
Yakuza is adaptable enough to make its sokaiya services available to management as a
means to silence dissenting shareholders. ALBERT J. ALLETZHAUSER, THE HOUSE OF
NOMURA: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE LEGENDARY JAPANESE DYNASTY 281-82 (1990).
Forty percent of 2,000 companies responding to a police survey said they had received
extortionist threats, and one-third of those paid off in amounts from $750 to $775,000.
The problem has gotten so bad that thousands of shareholders' meetings are held on the
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Keiretsu are the means by which Japan Inc. is pursuing a national
business strategy for dominance in the global marketplace. Historically,
keiretsu penetration of the United States market has followed a now familiar two step process. First, huge quantities of equivalent or superior
products (such as color televisions, VCRs, and stereo components) are
shipped to the target United States market at very low prices, that is,
prices below the level at which American competitors could profitably
sustain production over some reasonable term. Short-term profitability
does not matter because the process is sustained by: a pre-existing cartel

serving the Japanese market in which high prices can be charged; reciprocal institutional equity ownership that precludes stock sale (and devaluation) on low profit outcomes; a lower cost of capital; and the strategy
itself, which operates over a long time-horizon.
Ultimately the United States target market's producers and competitors are driven out with a few stragglers resorting to off-shore production. The target national market gradually accepts the low-value-added
role of a warehouser or, at best, an assembler. Once this occurs, the
second phase begins. Distribution channels can be intimidated and dominated. And more significantly, transfer prices to the warehouser or assembler can be raised to almost any level. Political resistance can be neutralized, or at least contained, by nationally coordinated lobbying, public
relations, and promotional efforts.
Domestic corporations are victimized when tax schemes are exported
into the United States, along with the goods the keiretsu produce and the
finances and services they offer. Some keiretsu apparently charge artificially high prices known as transfer prices when selling goods or providing services to their United States based subsidiaries and distributors.
This causes their United States operations to operate perennially at a
loss or with uneconomically low profit margins, notwithstanding steadily
increasing sales. 4 In effect, profits are laundered out of the United
States, resulting in a substantial underpayment of federal and state income taxes. A purely domestic corporation inflating expenses to reduce
taxable income undoubtedly would face a criminal tax evasion prosecution. American competitors have yet to find a legal remedy to counter the
same day to minimize the Yakuza's efforts to disrupt. Police Unprecedently Demand
Business Groups to Cut Yakuza Ties, Asahi News Service, June 28, 1991, available in

LEXIS, Nexis Library, ASAHI File; Greedy Gansters are Putting the Squeeze on Corporate Japan, Reuters, Dec. 31, 1990, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
14. Tax Underpayments By U.S. Subsidiaries of Foreign Companies: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Comm., 101st Cong.,

2d Sess. 149 (1990) [hereinafter Tax Underpayments] (statement of IRS Case Manager
Neil McNulty).
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competitive advantage gained through this foreign initiated form of tax
evasion.
The potential for transfer price manipulation should increase with Japan Inc.'s escalating direct investment in the United States. From 1986
through 1989, corporate Japan's direct investment through affiliate companies increased by ninety-eight percent. During the same period, corporate Japan increased its United States direct investment tenfold through
corporate acquisitions.1 5
The success of keiretsu's predatory and monopolistic transfer pricing
practices has forced many segments of American business into a veritable
defensive perimeter. The RICO hammer offers a strategic counterstroke,
attacking the tax fraud Achilles heel of Japan Inc., to re-establish genuine competitiveness. A more precise definition of keiretsu is no more necessary to address transfer pricing schemes than it was necessary to define
organized crime in order to reach gangster Al Capone for tax evasion."
This process of profit laundering is not unique to Japan Inc. Italian
financier Michele Sindona, a man with political, Vatican, and mob ties
who caused the collapse of the Franklin National Bank, 17 first described
cross-border tax evasion through inflated prices to me when I was analyzing the phenomenon of money laundering for the President's Commission on Organized Crime. 8 He offered this service to his clients
which made his law firm the most successful in Milan, Italy.a" Sindona
saw the process for what it was-tax evasion-so that when Italy made
tax evasion a crime, he claimed to have stopped doing it.20

Federal anti-money laundering laws, which the President's Commission proposed and which Congress adopted in 1986, owe much to
Sindona's insights. Sindona's grandiose sounding, but correct, view that
the real evil of money laundering is its power "to consume entire sectors
15. Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett, Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment
in the United States: A Reconsiderationof the Evidence at 16, 17 presented as a working
paper at the Conference on the International Aspects of Taxation, Cambridge: National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. (Sept. 27, 1991). However, a recent press report
indicates that the Japanese are reducing their investment abroad, James Sterngold, Japanese Shifting Investment Flow Back Home, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1992, at Al.
16. Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 553

(1932).
17.

Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980);

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON

ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND ATTORNEY GENERAL,
THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MONEY

LAUNDERING 83 n.3 (1984).
18. NICK TOSCHES, POWER ON EARTH

19.

Id.

20. Id.

87-98 (1986).
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economies, transforming them into feudi of an international ...

oligarchy beyond the reach of the law,"" is an apt description of the
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) which succumbed
to these anti-money laundering laws22 Federal anti-money laundering
laws, when used in combination with the RICO statute, also could reach
transfer pricing schemes involving income tax evasion.
IV.

TAX FRAUD IN THE BILLIONS

The United States Treasury loses billions of dollars in tax revenues
annually through transfer pricing techniques which launder profits overseas to tax havens. The precise amount of lost tax revenues is difficult to
quantify, but the indications and estimates are staggering. IRS Commissioner Fred T. Goldberg has concluded that, as a result of transfer pricing abuses, the United States government is being shortchanged billions
of dollars annually.2 3 Foreign controlled corporations doing business in
the United States paid only 4.4 billion dollars in federal income taxes in
1987 [See Chart #1], but reported taxable income as a percentage of
their gross receipts that was less than half the taxable income reported
by American companies doing business in the United States.2 4 [See
Chart #2]. One Congressional investigator has estimated that foreign
companies operating in the United States underpaid 16.5 billion dollars
in federal income taxes in 1987 alone. 25

A House Ways and Means Committee study of ten years of income
tax returns of thirty-six foreign owned automobile, motorcycle, and electronics equipment distributors indicated that one-half of them paid little
or no United States taxes. [See Box #1] One foreign-owned company
sold more than 3.5 billion dollars in goods in the United States, had
gross profits of almost 600 million dollars and paid only 500 dollars in
federal income taxes during that ten-year period.2 6
If these figures even approach the norm, transfer pricing schemes
could account for a significant part of the international trade deficit with
21.

Id. at 89.

22. Jonathan Beaty & S.C. Gwynne, The DirtiestBank of All, TIME, July 29, 1991,
at 42-47.
23. Tax Underpayments, supra note 14, at 62 (testimony of Fred T. Goldberg, IRS
Commissioner).
24. Id. at 65.
25.

William Triplett, Staff Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Remarks

of the U.S. Business & Industrial Council News Conference, Oct. 9, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
26. Tax Underpayments, supra note 14, at 15 (opening Statement of Chairman J.J.
Pickle).
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-CHART

1

Foreign-Controlled U.S. Corporations
(in billions of dollars)
Returns by Country
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Source: Internal Revenue Service
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CHART 2
Net Income (Less Deficit) as a Percentage of Total
Receipts
(In Percent)
U.S. Controlled
Domestic
Corporations

3

1.

2.7

2.7

2.

2.7
-2.3

Foreign Controlled
Domestic
Corporations

1.8

1981
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1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

Source: Internal Revenue Service

CHART 3

JAPANESE CONTROLLED U.S.
CORPORATIONS RECEIPTS
(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

JAPANESE COMPANY NET INCOME
(LESS DEFICIT)

1.3

D0.21

0.629
1

1984

1985

1988

1987

1994

1985

1988

1WON
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BOX NO. 1
A TEN YEAR SNAPSHOT
The House Ways and Means Committee analyzed the federal income tax returns filed over a ten year period by 36 foreign
owned U.S. distributors of automobiles, motorcycles and electronics
equipment including televisions, stereos, FAX machines and
VCR's. The study produced the following conclusions:
* One-half of the companies paid little or no federal
income tax;
" The major tax issue for these companies before the
IRS is reduction in taxable income through transfer
pricing;
" Most of the 36 companies engaged in questionable
transfer pricing practices;
* The 18 electronics distributors reported $116 billion
in gross receipts and paid only $654 million, or one
half of 1 percent, in Federal income tax;
" Only nine electronics companies reported positive
taxable income;
* Eight of the automobile and motorcycle companies
paid no federal income tax and IRS has proposed
$2.5 billion in adjustments to income;
* A foreign parent sold television sets to an unrelated
distributor for $150, while its subsidiary paid $250
for the same model;
* One foreign automobile manufacturer sold cars to
its U.S. distributor at prices averaging $800 more
than identical cars shipped to its Canadian distributor.

Source: House Ways and Means Committee
Based on Internal Revenue Service data.
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Japan, over fifty percent of which is in autos and auto parts.2" Furthermore, the problem is likely to worsen. The Office for the Study of Automotive Transportation at the University of Michigan predicts that the
automobile and auto parts trade deficit with Japan will widen from 31.1
billion dollars in 1990 to 45.7 billion dollars in 1994 in current dollars.2 8
Japanese automotive companies have a clear predisposition towards importing parts from Japan for assembly in the United States. Edward M.
Graham and Philip R. Krugman, fellows at the Institute for International Economics, have concluded that United States based Japanese
manufacturing operations are three times as likely to import parts from
Japanese suppliers for assembly in- the United States than the average
foreign-controlled affiliate does from its domestic suppliers. 9 Reports
published during President Bush's January 1992 trip to Japan indicated
that corporate Japan will increase the output at its United States transplants by roughly fifty percent in the next two or three years." Economist Clyde Prestowitz of the Economic Strategy Institute calculates that
the net impact of Japanese auto transplants has been a loss of about
eighty-three thousand jobs and 6.3 billion dollars in gross national
product."
Available evidence suggests that either Japan Inc. is committing tax
evasion on a massive scale or it does not know the value of the goods and
services it produces. Japan Inc. has earned steadily increasing revenues
in the United States during 1983 to 1987, yet produced an anomalous

decrease in net income during the same period. [See Chart #3]. A congressional study of IRS tax return data concluded that foreign subsidiaries of United States companies operating abroad "generally earn at 8 to
10 percent pretax net operating profit on their business receipts," while
United States subsidiaries of companies from Japan, Canada, United
Kingdom and West Germany operating in the United States earned only
32
0.1 percent on receipts, hardly a reason to do business here.

27.

SEAN P. MCALINDEN ET AL., THE UNIV. OF MICHIGAN TRANSP. RESEARCH
Report No. UMTRI 91-20, THE U.S.-JAPAN AUToMoTIvE BILATERAL 1994
TRADE DEFICIT 2 (1991).
28. Id. at 72.
29. EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, INST. FOR INTERNAT'L ECONOMICS, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 78 (2d ed. 1991).
INST.,

30. David E. Sanger, Trade Mission Ends in a Tense Meeting About Autos, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1992, at Al, All.
31.

CLYDE PRESTOWITZ ET AL., ECONOMIC STRATEGY INST., THE CASE FOR SAV-

(1992).
32. Tax Underpayments, supra note 14, at 96 (testimony of Charles S. Triplett,
Deputy Assoc. Chief Counsel, IRS).
ING THE BIG THREE 2
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A separate study of federal corporate income tax returns from 1980 to
1987 found various reasons for the low rate of return for foreign corpo-

rations in the United States. The authors of the study found, for example, that one-half of the difference in profitability could be explained by
a maturation process that all foreign corporations undergo in the United
States market, or by exchange rates having a significant effect on foreign
corporations' profitability, or by asset revaluation distorting the ratio of
taxable income to assets, or, finally, by the effect on profits of outside
purchases and investment income. The authors, however, concluded that
the other half of this profitability differential was unable to be explained
"by forces other than transfer pricing."" 3 Whatever the actual tax revenue loss, transfer pricing appears to have effectively subsidized Japanese
entry into United States markets at the expense of American business
interests.
Lack of an effective IRS response to international transfer pricing
abuses either represents a triumph of diplomatic nicety over evenhanded
enforcement of the nation's revenue laws or, more likely, shows that IRS
is seriously outgunned. As of February 1990, the IRS was handling 294
cases of transfer pricing abuses involving proposed income adjustments of
over thirteen billion dollars. 3 4 Congressional testimony refers to press accounts that seventeen Japanese companies-including the DaiichiKangyo Bank, NEC, Nissan, Sony America and Yamaha USA-have

33. The study, which used Treasury Department data, analyzed the federal corporate income tax returns (IRS form 1120) for the year 1987 of a cross section of 4000
domestically-controlled and 600 foreign-controlled corporations (excluding finance, insur-

ance, and real estate corporations). In addition, the authors constructed a second data set,
called a panel, using IRS Form 1120 data from 1980 to 1987 for firms with assets of $50
million or more. The panel data set included about 1300 domestically-controlled firms
and 110 foreign-controlled firms. According to the authors, the panel was valuable in
identifying the role of startup costs and exchange rates in evaluating the profits of foreign

and domestic corporations. Measuring return on investment as the ratio of taxable income over assets, the ratio was only 0.58 for foreign-controlled companies compared with
2.14 for domestically-controlled companies in 1987. The authors of the study also analyzed the returns of 86 Japanese companies in a cross section of 528 foreign-controlled
companies. According to the study, corporate Japan's 1987 profitability taxable income/
assets ratio is -0.025 and, the authors noted, its debt/assets ratio is 0.097 which is a full
10 percentage points higher than domestically-controlled companies. Timothy Goodspeed

et al., Explaining the Low Taxable Income of Foreign Controlled Companies in the
United States 1, 2, 4-6, Tables 1.1 and 2.4 presented at the Conference on the International Aspects of Taxation, Cambridge; National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
(Sept. 28, 1991).
34. Tax Underpayments,supra note 14, at 53 (statement of Patrick G. Heck, Assistant Counsel, Subcomm. on Oversight, Comm. on Ways and Means).

16
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BOX NO. 2
SONY'S 1989-1990 BOX SCORE

The Sony 20-F SEC filings disclosed the following for the, years ended
1989 and 1990 (in thousands of dollars and percentage):
Sony Corporation
1989
Sales:
Japan
U.S.
Europe
All Other
Total
Income before Taxes::
Japan
Foreign
Total
Income Taxes Current:
Japan
Foreign
Total

1990

$5,540,129
4,441,500
3,771,530
2,499,333
$16,252,492

34.1%
27.3
23.2
15.4
100.0%

$5,538,077
5,463,771
4,556,828
2,784,356
$18,343,032

30.2%
29.8
24.8
15.2
100.0%

775,689
478,220
$1,253,909

61.9%
38.1
100.0%

$996,293
452,299
$1,448,592

68.8%
31.2
100.0%

$491,614
198,757

71.2%
28.8

$568,866
246,529

69.8%
30.2

$690,371

100.0%

$815,395

100.0%

Sony is representing that in 1989 and 1990 sales in Japan by the Japanese
parent and its domestic subsidiaries generated 32% of total sales, 65.6% of
pre-tax income and 70.4% of income tax payments. Or in other words,
foreign sales (i.e., sales of the foreign subsidiaries of Sony) of 68% generated only 34.4% of the income before tax and only 29.6% of 1989 and 1990

tax payments. Sony has stated publicly that its tax returns have been prepared in compliance with IRS regulations and that IRS routinely has audited those returns.
Source: House Ways and Means Committee and Sony's 20-F
SEC filings for 1989 and 1990
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been under IRS investigation for transfer pricing abuses. 5 Since IRS
administrative proceedings are confidential, these reports cannot be verified. Tax court dockets disclose only litigation against Yamaha,3" as of
March 1992. IRS claims that Yamaha underreported its income and underpaid income taxes by a total of $133 million from 1977 to 1984, and
is attempting, as well, to collect $13 million in assessed penalties."
Not every low-performing, foreign-controlled corporation engages in
tax evasion through transfer pricing. For example, concluding solely
from Sony's 1989 and 1990 SEC filings that the company has engaged in
tax evasion through transfer pricing could be unfair, even though goods
sold abroad by Sony's foreign subsidiaries earned approximately twothirds of pretax income, but accounted for less than one-third of income
taxes paid. JSee Box #2]. No two industries are alike. Firms within an
industry may do business in very different ways. Conceivably, interest
and depreciation, costs often associated with startups, or fluctuations in
exchange rates, could account for the low tax rates of a given foreign
owned company. Perhaps a particular Japanese company was less profit
driven due to the low cost of capital.
Suggested responses to the problem have focused on governmental action. Graham and Krugman believe that widespread transfer price manipulation could represent an "important additional cost" of foreign direct investment in the United States, such that those who evaded taxes
through transfer schemes should be "prosecuted to the full extent of the
law." 3 8 Prestowitz summarizes the pernicious effect of transfer pricing
abuses as follows:

35. Id. at 298 (statement of Rep. Duncan Hunter from California).
36. Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, No. 2674-88
(T.C. filed Feb. 11, 1988). The Conventionfor the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Mar. 8, 1971, U.S.Japan, 23 U.S.T. 969, T.I.A.S. 7365 (1971), reprinted in 1973-1 C.B. 630 (hereinafter
"Convention on Double Taxation") may account for the lack of court action on transfer
pricing cases involving "inbound" products. The Convention on Double Taxation gives a
taxpayer the option to elect an arbitration procedure in which competent United States
and Japanese tax authorities participate, "notwithstanding the remedies provided by the
national laws of the contracting states." Id., art. 2(f) & art. 25; Rev. Pro. 91-23, 1991-11
I.R.B. 18 as clarified by Rev. Pro. 91-26, 1991-17 I.R.B. 7. Corporations elect this
arbitral process so often that "inbound" transfer pricing cases rarely see the light of day
through litigation. Whether the Convention on Double Taxation provides an alternative
means of dispute resolution or a mandatory condition precedent to IRS-initiated transfer
price litigation is beyond the scope of this Article.
37. Robert Pear, InvestigatingForeign Companies For Tax Cheating, N.Y. TiMES,
Feb. 18, 1990, at Al.
38. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 29, at 82-83.
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Components imported by the transplants from their parent companies in
Japan are priced at levels almost equal to the cost of the completed vehicle
imported fully built-up from Japan. This results in a significant profit
drain from the United States entity in favor of the Japanese parent
company.
As a consequence, United States operations have incurred huge losses with
a proportionate surge in Japanese profits. No taxes are paid in the United
States because of the large loss carry forwards booked by the transplants.
Behind this phenomenon is the keiretsu structure of Japanese industry.
39

To counter these practices, Prestowitz urges continuous IRS audits of
keiretsu transfer pricing.4 Increased IRS scrutiny would serve the interest of recouping lost tax dollars and would have an important deterrent
effect. IRS activity, however, would produce no tangible result for American businesses already harmed by transfer pricing abuses.
V.

RICO's

TERRIBLE SWIFT DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD

Conventional wisdom holds that the private sector has no remedy for
injury- producing tax evasion or other keiretsu practices. The only time
that a reported federal court opinion even mentioned the word "keiretsu"
was during the 1981 to 1983 "television cases," which attempted unsuccessfully to use the antitrust laws to counter collusive Japanese business

practices. 41 What is needed for a wrong perceived to be beyond the law
is a solution not bounded by convention. Only RICO could provide a
means for American companies injured by these practices to take matters
into their own hands and recover compensation for damages sustained
from any provable keiretsu tax evasion scheme. RICO should only be"
used in this way as a response to evidence that tax evasion through
transfer pricing formed a conscious and effective part of an exploitative
business strategy of a particular Japanese company.

Enacted in 1970, RICO has proven to be the most powerful law ever
used against organized crime. Mafia trials around the country-in New
39. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 31, at 57.
40. Id. at 113.
41. Although the subject is beyond the scope of this Article, RICO and mail fraud
may be a possible response to some keiretsu anticompetitive practices beyond the reach of
the antitrust laws and that do not necessarily involve tax evasion. See United States v.
Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1990) (prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §
1343).
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York, Chicago, Kansas City, and Boston-as well as the government's
successful effort to impose court supervision on the Teamsters Union and
other labor unions, attest to its effectiveness.
The source of RICO's potency, at least partly, is that under RICO,
the "pattern" of criminal activity is the crime. By using a common sense
approach to the nature of organized crime-that is, collective criminality
to further institutional Mafia interests rather than isolated crime committed for individual gain-RICO makes it a criminal offense to "engage in a pattern of racketeering activity," 4' 2 the very lifeblood of Mafia
enterprise. RICO's application is not limited to organized crime' 3 as
Drexel Burnham and Michael Milken found out."
Crimes prosecuted as part of a RICO pattern must include two or
more specific criminal offenses, among them mail and wire fraud and
money laundering."5 Each mailing and wire transmission used in furtherance of a scheme to defraud and each money laundering transaction
is a separate racketeering act. Ipso facto RICO's pattern materializes
when two or more such offenses are linked in a way which transgresses
RICO's bar against institutionalized crime."
RICO does more than simply define criminality. RICO provides victims of racketeering with the civil right to hold racketeers accountable,
whether or not they are certified mobsters. In the tradition of victims'
rights, RICO permits those injured by a "pattern of racketeering activity" to recover treble damages and collect attorneys fees.' 7 This monetary
triple threat openly encourages private attorneys general' 8 to police the
mob, or those who behave like the mob.

42.
43.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985); H.J. Inc. v. North-

western Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
44. William Glaberson, Racketeering Cases Are Popping Up in Several Varieties,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1990, at D6.
45. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)(B) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
46. In general, the elements of a RICO claim are as follows:
(1) that the defendant (2) through the commission of two or more acts (3) constituting a "pattern" (4) of "racketeering activity" (5) directly or indirectly invests

in, or maintains an interest in, or participates in (6) an "enterprise" (7) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.
Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1025 (1984). A threat of continued racketeering must also be present. See H.J. Inc. v.

Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
47. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
48. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151
(1987) (RICO "bring[s] to bear the pressure of 'private attorneys general' on a serious
national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate.").
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The civil side of RICO's two-edged sword is every bit as sharp as its
criminal edge. Unfortunately, business has often found itself on the receiving end of nuisance civil RICO cases which accounts for much of its
ongoing campaign to lobby for changes in RICO's civil side. On occasion, though, RICO exposure can be terminal. Hundreds of millions of
dollars may be at stake, for example, when a public utility is alleged to
have committed fraud during the utility rate making process. 49 The principle at work in the utilities cases also underlies the keiretsu tax evasion
model-RICO can redress the fraudulent subversion of governmental
processes.
Business' anti-RICO lobbying efforts do not take into proper account
RICO's positive side. For example, IBM, in its well-known civil case
against Hitachi, used RICO (with a notable assist from an FBI undercover investigation) to collect reportedly 300 million dollars in damages

after the Japanese firm pleaded guilty to stealing IBM trade secrets.50

VI. RICO

AND KEIRETSU TAX EVASION

RICO can be just as effective where the issue is not industrial espionage, but tax evasion. To use RICO in the keiretsu setting, two criteria
must be met: first, a Japanese company must have sold products or services at higher than their real market value to a related United States
company and, second, this must have been done, at least in part, with the
intention to evade the payment of federal or state income taxes that
would have been due otherwise had these products or services been
priced at their true market value.
To understand the law's application in this setting, the assumed components of a tax evasion scheme must be reduced to their simplest terms.
A foreign parent company provides goods or services to a related United
States based entity at artificially high prices, thereby reducing United
States taxable income. The entity transfers funds to the Japanese parent
to pay for those goods or services, files corporate tax returns and then
pays lower United States taxes as a result of the shift of profit from the

49. See, e.g., Taffet v. Southern Co., 930 F.2d 847 (11th Cir. 1991); County 6f

Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990).

50. See International Business Machines Corp. v. Hitachi Ltd., No. C-82-4976

(N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 16, 1982); United States v. Nakazawa et al., No. 184 MB (N.D.
Cal. filed June 22, 1982); United States v. Kanzuma, No. 187 MB (N.D. Cal., filed
June 22, 1982). Mike Van Deelen, Analyst for Ranscher Pierce Refshes, Inc., Investest
Report No, 400510 (Dec. 6, 1983) available in LEXIS, Company Library, RPR File.
Court records, however, did not reveal the precise settlement terms.
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United States to Japan. American competitors are placed at a disadvantage and are hurt in some quantifiable way. If these assumptions are
proved true in a given case, then RICO's "pattern of racketeering activity" would consist of mail or wire fraud and money laundering
violations.
Mail or wire fraud is simply a scheme to defraud furthered by the use
of the mails or wire transmission. 5 ' In the keiretsu model, the United
States government and American businesses are generally both the intended and actual victims of this racketeering scheme. The IRS loses tax
dollars and businesses lose market share and profits.
Money laundering is the conduct of52 or attempt to conduct:5 3 finan5
cial transactions involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity '

(in this instance, mail or wire fraud); the international transportation of
the proceeds; 55 or monetary transactions in property constituting or derived from the proceeds of a criminal offense.56 The profit-shifting (representing fraudulently concealed taxable income) from a foreign controlled corporation to Japan, Inc. could be viewed as laundering
transactions and transportation. Using RICO this way privatizes enforcement of public tax policy, a controversial and untested idea.5 7

51. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1343 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
52. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(2) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
53. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956(a)(1)-(2), 1957(a) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
54. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956(a), (c)(7) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
55. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(2).
56. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(a).
57. Using civil RICO to address federal income tax evasion unquestionably is novel.
The Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits appear prepared to permit the use of
RICO premised on mail or wire fraud in tax fraud cases. See United States v. Computer
Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1187-88 n.13 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1105 (1983); United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204, 1216 n.17 (9th Cir. 1976), cert
denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977); United States v. Mirabile, 503 F.2d 1065, 1066-67 (8th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); United States v. Flaxman, 495 F.2d 344,
348-49 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974). The Second Circuit called it a
"disputed issue." United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1991). But see
United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming RICO conviction
premised on state tax evasion).
United States Department of Justice policy permits the use of RICO in criminal tax
fraud cases if "exceptional circumstances" exist "when individuals, through no deliberate

fault of their own, were demonstrably victimized as a result of a defendant's fraudulent
scheme and use of a [RICO] mail fraud charge is necessary to achieve some legitimate,
practical purpose like securing restitution for the individual victims." DEPARTMENT OF
§ 6-4.211(1) (Supp. 1990-1). This is the precise effect of a keiretsu
tax evasion scheme.
Even if civil RICO does not give victims a remedy for federal income tax fraud, no

JUSTICE MANUAL
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INTENT IS THE KEY

The most difficult element to prove in the keiretsu transfer pricing
context would be state of mind or intent. The key question would be:
Did the transfer pricing have an economic justification, or was it intended to shift profits out of the United States for the purpose of reducing taxable income? Any willful failure to report income, knowing it was
taxable or possessing an intent to evade taxes and defraud the government would establish this type of RICO violation.5 8
In any RICO transfer pricing case, the issue of intent would first turn
on whether the transfer price was too high. A keiretsu's deliberate decision not to use market value (which the IRS judges by what it calls the
"arms length" standard)5 9 in establishing transfer price makes a compel-

such limitation exists with respect to state tax fraud. United States v. De Fiore, 720 F.2d

757 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241 (1984); United States v. Brewer, 528
F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Melvin, 544 F.2d 767 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 910 (1977); Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Mirabile, 503 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975).
Since a keiretsu tax evasion scheme is likely to have state tax authorities as ancillary
victims, as well as the IRS, RICO's applicability to federal income tax fraud is of little
consequence. All that matters is that tax evasion (whether federal or state) injured a
United States company. See also G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of
the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposalsfor Reform:
"Mother of God-Is This the End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 908 n. 153
(1990) ("Retailers that have to compete with tax cheating competitors are put at a substantial and often disabling competitive disadvantage. This problem also implicates
RICO's core concerns. Unfair competition, rooted in the profits of illegal behavior, goes
to RICO's basic rationale.").
Some states tax multinational corporations based on profits derived from within the
state. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 29, at 135. Others, such as California, Florida,
New York, and Massachusetts, utilize what is known as a "worldwide unitary taxation"
formula permitting taxation of profits from in-state operations wherever derived. Id.;
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983). Under either approach, deliberate understatement of income through transfer pricing abuses could result
in evasion of state income taxes.
58. See United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360-61 (1973); United States v. Gelb,
700 F.2d 875, 879 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 853 (1983); see also 18 U.S.C.A. §§
1341, 1343, 1956(1)(A)(ii); I.R.C. §§ 7201, 7206 (West 1988).
59. The Internal Revenue Code allows the IRS to allocate income deductions between commonly controlled taxpayers "to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the
income" of those taxpayers. I.R.C. § 482 (West 1988). The standard used for making
those allocations is called the arm's length method, that is, an uncontrolled taxpayer

dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer. Treas. Reg. § 1-482-1(b)(1)
(1990). Under the regulation, a "controlled" taxpayer means "any one of two or more
organizations, trades or businesses owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests". Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(4).
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ling case for an intent to evade taxes. Paradoxically, a RICO transfer
pricing case would turn on the purposeful use of a false valuation, a
simple fact, though not so simple to prove. It would not turn on the
complex tax formulation used in IRS transfer pricing civil audits, which
seeks to allocate taxable income between a foreign parent and its United
States subsidiary. In any event, these income allocation methods are intended "to prevent evasion of taxes," not to be used as a means to commit tax evasion. 60
False book entries or alterations, phony invoices, a consistent pattern

of under-reporting large amounts of income,"1 or any conduct likely to
mislead or conceal,62 would justify an inference that the purpose was to
evade taxes. That transfer pricing did, in fact, reduce United States taxable income also would be relevant evidence of intent. Laundering profits
through third country tax havens also would tend to prove a tax evasion
motive."3

The IRS uses four methods to determine the appropriate transfer price: the controlled
price method based on comparable sales, the resale price method based on an appropriate
resale profit margin, the cost profit method based on a cost plus analysis, and a residual
category, usually based on financial ratios such as return on equity, when the first three
methods do not apply. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(1)-(4) (1990); see, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996 (1985), affd in part and rev'd in part, 856 F.2d 855
(7th Cir. 1988).
On January 27, 1992, the Treasury Department proposed new transfer pricing regulations that clarify the arm's length standard as follows:
In determining whether controlled taxpayers have dealt with each other at arm's
length, the general principle to be followed is whether uncontrolled taxpayers,
each exercising sound business judgment on the basis of reasonable levels of experience (or, if greater, the actual level of experience of the controlled taxpayer)
within the relevant industry and with full knowledge of the relevant facts, would
have agreed to the same contractual terms under the same economic conditions and
other circumstances.
The proposed regulations added the following definitions:
1.482-1(a)(4) The term "uncontrolled taxpayer" means any one of two or more
organizations, trades, or businesses not owned or controlled directly or indirectly
by the same interests.
(5) The terms "uncontrolled group" and "group of uncontrolled taxpayers"
means the organizations, trades, or businesses not owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by the same interests.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File. The
comment period on the proposed regulations ends May 31, 1992.
60. I.R.C. § 482 (1988).

61. See United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1980).
62. See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943).
63. The precise direct monetary benefit to Japan Inc. of a transfer pricing scheme
could be determined through an analysis of the ultimate repatriation of the laundered

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

VIII.

THE LONG ARM OF

[VoL 25.3

RICO

United States courts have jurisdiction over United States subsidiaries
of foreign companies, but the issue is whether RICO can reach the Japan-based controller of a keiretsu tax evasion conspiracy. In other words,
do United States courts have jurisdiction over the Japanese parent corporation or partner? RICO can reach beyond United States borders
through a principle of international law known as extraterritorial jurisdiction,6 4 but only if some racketeering activity took place or had a substantial effect in the United States.6 5 RICO's global reach is particularly
clear when racketeering involves money-laundering because Congress explicitly gave federal anti-money laundering laws an international
scope.6" Therefore, the foreign parent of a United States subsidiary could
be a defendant in a civil RICO action. Similarly, relevant information
may be secured from the Japanese parent of a United States-based subsidiary through the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure since the court would have in personam6 7 jurisdiction over the

taxable income to Japan or its subsequent use outside of Japan. Tax treatment in Japan
of such funds repatriated through a third nation is beyond the scope of this Article.
64. James D. Harmon, Jr., United States Money LaunderingLaws: International
Implications, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 18-23 (1988).
65. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1991) (subject matter jurisdiction); see
also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965.
Congress enacted § 6038(C) to give the IRS the power to force foreign parent corporations to produce records dealing with transfer pricing. I.R.C. § 6038(C) (West 1990).
See H.R. REP. 881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 318-20 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2320-32. This creates no independent private right to secure these
records. RICO does not provide for international service of process. Jurisdictional issues
with respect to the production of documentary materials located outside of the United
States is beyond the scope of this Article.
66. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956(f), 1957(d) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
67. Courts find in personam jurisdiction over foreign parents of United States subsidiaries, branches, or agencies by virtue of he parent's activities in the United States.
Matter of Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied 463 U.S.
1215 (1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom Bank Of Novia Scotia v. U.S., 462 U.S. 1119 (1983); United States v.
Toyota Motor Corp., 561 F. Supp. 354 and 569 F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1983). Effective service was made on the subsidiary or branch office in the United States in these

cases,
Courts first determine whether there is statutory authority for the in personam jurisdiction. In a transfer price audit IRS sought certain books and records located in Japan.
Service on Toyota, Japan was made on Toyota, U.S.A. in California. The court concluded that Toyota Japan could be "found" within the meaning of the IRS service of
process statute, I.R.C. § 7604(a), for jurisdictional purposes in Torrance, California,
where its subsidiary was located. Toyota Motor Corp., 561 F. Supp. at 357. According to
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foreign parent, or through letters rogatory.6 s
press reports, IRS claimed that Toyota together with Nissan Motor Corp. owed one
billion dollars in federal income taxes. Toyota and Nissan reportedly settled for hundreds
of millions of dollars to be paid to IRS. Both Toyota and Nissan were reportedly reimbursed by the Japanese government for the deficiency. Japan. U.S. Agree to Prevent
Double Taxation, Japan Economic Newswire, Oct. 31, 1988 available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Jeni File; Gary Klott, Texaco Case Part of Growing Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES,
'Jan. 15, 1988, p. 4 .
RICO's service of process provision contains language similar to that of I.R.C.
§ 7604(a), which was at issue in Toyota Motor Co. RICO process "may be served on
any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent,
or transacts his affairs." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(d). Given RICO's purposefully broad
scope, its public interest function and its role as an adjunct to law enforcement, courts
should resolve in personam jurisdictional issues in RICO transfer pricing as they have
done in criminal, grand jury and IRS summons enforcement proceedings. E.g., Matter of
Marc Rich & Co., A.G.; In re Grand Jury Proceedings. Service on the United States
subsidiary in the United States should be sufficient regardless of its status as a distinct
corporate entity. Toyota Motor Co., 561 F.Supp. at 360.
Due process permits such an approach with respect to U.S. based keiretsu operations.
See Lisak v. Mercantile BanCorp., Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1987) (RICO contains an explicit grant of nationwide service which does not violate the Due Process
clause). A foreign corporation that has purposefully delivered "its products into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers" in
the United States is within the jurisdiction of its courts. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woolson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
Such jurisdiction may be defined as either "general" or "limited" depending upon how

substantial and systematic the contacts are with the forum. General jurisdiction permits
in personamjurisdiction even if the cause of action is unrelated to the defendant's forum
activities. Limited jurisdiction arises from activity in the forum related to the cause of
action. Data Disc., Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287
(9th Cir. 1977); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 413 (9th
Cir. 1977). Contacts with the United States, not any individual state, should be determinative. See Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d at 667 (The court did not examine New
York's long arm statute because "[t]he subject of the grand jury's investigation is the
possible violation of federal revenue statutes, and the right to inquire of appellant depends upon appellant's contacts with the entire United States, not simply the State of
New York"). Toyota Motor Corp. found limited jurisdiction in the "purposeful exploitation of the forum by Toyota, Japan." 561 F. Supp. at 359. The court concluded that
"there is no obstacle to jurisdiction over the foreign parent if it uses its subsidiary as a
marketing conduit." Id. United States courts should exercise jurisdiction under either
theory-limited or general jurisdiction-when faced with transfer pricing abuses linked
to access to United States markets.
68. A letter rogatory is a formal request by a United States court to a foreign court
seeking the performance of some judicial act. James P. Springer, An Overview of Inter-

national Evidence And Asset Gathering in Civil and Criminal Tax Cases, 22 GEo.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 277, 312 (1989). The procedure is fraught with time delays

and dependent upon foreign and domestic bureaucracies and foreign judicial procedures
over which the United States courts and litigants have no control. Id. at 312-13. The

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

IX.

[Vol 25.3

DAMAGES AND PROOF

Proving a RICO violation, predicated upon tax fraud through transfer

pricing is only half the battle. An American competitor still must prove
that it sustained, either directly or indirectly, damages "by reason of" a
tax evasion racket.6 The Supreme Court recognizes that RICO damages
include "competitive injury," 7 0 or as Justice Marshall explained it, loss
to "competitors and investors whose businesses and interests are harmed
...or whose competitive positions decline because of infiltration in the
relevant market. 1 In Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., the Supreme
Court postulated at some length those scenarios that would produce
"competitive injury" cognizable under RICO. These seem to anticipate
application to keiretsu racketeering as follows:
If a "racketeer" uses "[t]hreats, arson and assault [or other racketeering
conduct] ... to force competitors out of business and obtain larger shares
of the market" . . . [t]he pattern of those acts is designed to accomplish,

and accomplishes, the goal of monopolization. Competitors thereby injured
or forced out of business could allege "RICO" injury and recover damages
for lost profits.
[I]f the enterprise conducts its business through a pattern of racketeering
activity to enhance its profits or perpetuate its economic power, competitors of that enterprise could bring a civil RICO action alleging injury by
reason of the enhanced commercial position the enterprise has obtained
from its unlawful acts ....
Alternatively, if the infiltrated business operates a legitimate business to a
businessman's disadvantage because of the enterprise's strong economic
base derived from perpetration of predicate acts, the competitor 72could
bring civil RICO action alleging injury to his competitive position.

letters rogatory process has been streamlined and standardized in civil and commercial
disputes by the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil & Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, reprinted in USCS Conventions, Taking Evidence Abroad Cony. (1983). To date, Japan
is not a signatory to that convention.
69. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c).
70. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.15 (1985); see also, Holmes
v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., No. 90-727, 1992 WL 52846, at *8 n.20 (U.S.
Mar. 24, 1992) (plaintiffs may recover damages under RICO for injury proximately
caused by the defendant, which determination is made on a case by case basis). In a
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia proposed a "zone of interests" test that would "vary
according to the nature of the criminal offenses upon which those causes of action are
based." Id. at *14.
71. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 521-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority in Sedima adopted a
broader view, concluding that recoverable RICO damagei include "but are not limited
to, the sort of competitive injury for which the dissenters would allow recovery." Id. at
497, n. 15.
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BOX NO. 3
A SMOKING GUN
What follows is a copy of a FAX to a Japanese parent automobile
company from a U.S. subsidiary responding to a complaint from the parent
that the subsidiary was making too much profit in the U.S.
(TRANSLATION)
1

01- (illegible)

To:
Dated: Dee. 28, '82.
From:
(file)
Subject: Price of 83 Models
Re 12/28 fax from Overseas Sales Division.
The kind of letter which one doesn't rare to read so close to the year's end or that something which one
has always been fearing might happen, has finally arrived.
0announcement that it was expecting increased earnings for next term (or this term, more
correctly speaking), gives us the impression that it is determined to maximize profits in the U.S. market.
companies making
has a strong aversion to the
Apparently,
I who told us quite
excessive profits. This was expressed quite dearly by Mr.
is that we are making too much profit. Mr.
bluntly that the biggest problem with
that he wanted us to
also relayed to us a message from Mr.
sell more trucks. Any way, frankly speaking, we cannot understand why they have sent us this long fax.
In the past one year, we have been screaming at them every time they wanted to raise the prices. Is this
a sort of pre-emptive strike to discourage our attempt to obtain a price reduction? Or are they proposing
In the
importers? I have not had a chance to talk with
it to
meantime, I am still wondering how I should respond. If you have any suggestions, please let me know.
In other woreds, they are telling us that they will not talk about any price reduction and that we should
put up with the deficit and spend money for sales promotion of trucks.
Should we just meekly do what we are told to do without complaining or should we assert that we
believe to be right? Please give us your guidance on this point.
At least, we would like to reserve to ourselves the right to raise the retail price to maintain our profitability.
in early March, the reason being.
We plan to call on
1) That our '82 earnings and the '83 January earnings are expected to be positive, which make our
presentations less convincing. Besides, our presentation materials won't be ready until after the end of
January.
2) Both sides are likely to be very busy.
3) It may be better to go in March with the deficit figures of February in hand.
Your comments are invited.
We would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your cooperation throughout the year and wish
you a happy New Year. Say hello to all.
Sincerely,
It's illegior of Mr.
P.S. The seal on the fax is that of Mr.
ble.

The FAX, written in Japanese, was given to the IRS by the subsidiary
which claimed it meant nothing. Upon translation, IRS concluded that its
purpose was to increase earnings in Japan by raising the transfer price of
cars to the United States. Any such FAX or memo would be evidence of a
tax evasion intent because the transfer price was set without any regard to
the intrinsic value of the cars sold to the U.S. subsidiary. The identities of
the companies involved have not been disclosed.

Source: House Ways and Means Committee and Internal Revenue Service
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The measure of damages could be gain to any proven tax evader computed as enhanced revenues or, possibly, loss to the IRS resulting from a
keiretsu tax scheme, or consequent loss to a particular American business. Consistent with the "express admonition that RICO is to 'be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes,' "' ultimate recovery
could be multiples of lost tax dollars. Little beyond this is certain. RICO
damages theory is early in its evolution with little precedent. Theory is
one thing; proof quite another. As is true in any case, a RICO violation
may be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence. The best cases
would rely on both. The primary facts to be proven would be the tax
evasion scheme of Japan Inc. and its United States based subsidiary and
competitive injury sustained as a result of racketeering, not some other
cause like management incompetence or product inferiority.
Direct evidence is likely to come only from insiders or former insiders.
Whistleblowers may come forward given the incentive from federal
bounty hunter laws of sharing on a percentage basis (possibly up to
twenty-five percent) in any recovery to the IRS resulting from detection
of a transfer pricing tax evasion scheme."' The existence of a single

memorandum, or its destruction or alteration, could prove devastating.
[See Box #3] Sophisticated investigative techniques may be required to
develop such evidence before the commencement of a case, because pretrial discovery remains the only other, less efficient, option for developing
insider information.
Given the government's tight control over information held by the
IRS, 75 alternative means must be used to determine the tax treatment of

73. Id. at 498 (quoting Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947).
74. A person who provides information of tax evasion is eligible to receive a reward
"4normally not to exceed" ten percent of taxes, penalties, and fines then collected as a
result of the information. I.R.C. § 7623 (West 1988); Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1 (1990).
One who brings a civil fraud suit for treble damages on behalf of the government under
the False Claims Act based on conduct before October 27, 1986 may be entitled to 25
percent of any recovery by the government. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(e), 3730(d) (West Supp.
1991). A number of states have similar privateering laws.
To give more incentive to whistleblowers, Congress should amend the False Claims
Act to make it applicable to post-October 27, 1986 conduct rising to the level of tax
evasion in violation of I.R.C. § 7201 that is committed by foreign-controlled corporations
through transfer pricing abuses.
75. IRS obtains information from three sources: taxpayers, third parties, and other
tax authorities. Whether any of this information could be available to a private litigant in
a civil RICO action depends on the relevant international treaty, Internal Revenue Code
and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provisions. The Convention on Double Taxation
permits IRS to exchange information for the purpose of "preventing fraud or fiscal evasion". Convention On Double Taxation, supra note 36, art. 26(1). Through this infor-
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inflated transfer prices. The most obvious source of evidence of keiretsu
mation sharing process IRS may already have secured evidence of keiretsu transfer pricing abuses between Japanese parents and their United States subsidiaries. IRS may
disclose such information in court proceedings:
The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information as is pertinent to carrying out the provisions of this Convention or preventing
fraud or fiscal evasion in relation to the taxes which are the subject of this Convention. Any information so exchanged shall be treated as secret and shall not be
disclosed to any persons other than those (including a court or administrative
body) concerned with assessment, collection, enforcement or prosecution in respect
of the taxes which are the subject of this Convention.
Convention On Double Taxation, supra note 36, art. 26. The secrecy provisions of the
Convention On Double Taxation: "[do] not prohibit disclosure in the course of a court
proceeding" (emphasis added). Technical Explanation concerning the Convention on
Double Taxation prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, appended to statement by Edwin
S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, 1973-1 C.B. 630, 668.
Apart from the Convention on Double Taxation, the Internal Revenue Code provides
guidelines for the disclosure of IRS information. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (West Supp. 1991)
sets forth the "general rule" that "returns" and "return information", I.R.C. §
6103(b)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1991), are confidential and may not be disclosed except,
inter alia, in a federal or state judicial or administrative proceeding "pertaining to tax
administration". I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1991). See also, United States v.
Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 40 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1978) ("This language does not evidence an
intention to adopt a restrictive interpretation of 'tax administration'."). At least one court
has determined that I.R.C. § 6103 does not bar discovery of IRS tax information in
private civil non-tax cases. See, McSurley v. McAdams, 502 F. Supp. 52, 56 (D.D.C.
1980) ("The legislative history surrounding § 6103 indicates that Congress simply never
addressed the issue of access to tax information by private parties in non-tax civil cases,
pursuant to court discovery orders . .[j]udicial supervision of the discovery process will
ensure that access is far from wholesale, moreover, the institution of properly tailored
protective orders will minimize any resulting invasion of privacy").
Accordingly, in the event that IRS should commence a civil or criminal-action which
parallels a private civil RICO action, neither the Convention on Double Taxation nor
I.R.C. § 6103 would bar disclosure of any IRS information regardless of its origins.
In the absence of such a parallel IRS-initiated action, disclosure of foreign source
information would depend on whether a private civil RICO action standing alone, was
found to be: (a) a court proceeding "concerned with assessment, collection, enforcement
or prosecution in respect of [income taxes within the meaning of the Convention]", or (b)
a federal judicial proceeding "pertaining to tax administration" within the meaning of
I.R.C. § 6103, or (c) that discovery within the RICO action is permitted under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Of course, disclosure of other non-foreign source information would be premised solely on meeting the requirements of I.R.C. § 6103 or the
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Neither the Convention on Double Taxation nor the Internal Revenue Code should
prevent the disclosure of tax information in a private civil RICO action premised on
transfer price manipulation. By definition, such a civil RICO action requires proof of tax
evasion. Therefore, it is "concerned with" and "pertain[s] to" the assessment and admin-
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transfer pricing practices is previous IRS transfer pricing audits and
cases. The problem of access to tax information could be alleviated were
the IRS to join the RICO suit in order to recover lost taxes, a prospect
7
which would seem likely given allegations of massive tax fraud. 1
Circumstantial evidence is often as compelling as direct evidence. In
the tax evasion scenario posited here, expert testimony could establish
the causal link between racketeering and damages sustained by an
American competitor of a keiretsu, in much the same way as is done in
dumping cases." Such things as reduced profits and loss of market share
are relevant. For example, economist Prestowitz determined that United
States car makers operate with a cost disadvantage of two thousand dollars per car as compared with the Japanese auto industry.7 8 If this cost
differential is partly the product of tax evasion, then this evidence would
support RICO's damage causation element. A reasonable hypothesis is
that loss of price advantage produced a decline in market position.
Chronology, the relation of things in time, is especially important. If
goods or services were sold to a foreign-controlled United States based
corporation at a transfer price determined only at fiscal year-end, then
the inference would be that taxes, not economics, determined that price.
X.

INJUNCTION, RISKS, AND POLITICAL BLINDSIDING

An injunction may be used to secure an immediate cessation of transfer pricing abuses. An injunction is a front-loaded strategy intended to
produce real market results at the outset and to protect American competitors from further loss during the pendency of the case. If the evidence
shows a likelihood of prevailing and a threat of irreparable harm, then a

istration of income taxes. This is especially so since a judgment could have a preclusive
effect through collateral estoppel with respect to the issue of tax evasion, thus giving IRS

a direct stake in the outcome of the case. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154,
158 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-95 (1980) (offensive collateral estoppel).
76. One court has held that the government has no right of action for treble damages
under RICO. United States v. The Bonano Organized Crime Family, 839 F.2d 20 (2d
Cir. 1989). The government's participation may be based on a theory other than RICO.
77. Dumping cases are handled by the International Trade Administration of the
United States Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission. In a
bifurcated process, a determination is made whether an import is being sold below fair
market value, such that United States industry is injured or threatened with injury. See
19 U.S.C.A. § 1673(a)-(g) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991); 19 C.F.R. §§ 201, 207 (1990).
The result is the imposition of antidumping duties on imported goods, not the damages to
injured United States companies that RICO might provide.
78. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 31, at 3.
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federal court could enjoin"9 the Japanese company and its United States
counterpart from setting artificially high transfer prices. This would
have the significant advantage of testing the theories upon which the case

is premised, producing an early result for an American competitor, and
sending an unequivocal message to corporate Japan.
All litigation has risk. The use of RICO in the keiretsu setting is
novel, and a court could impose monetary sanctions against the plaintiff,
but only if the legal theory is found by the court to be frivolous and
unsupported by the facts. 80 The best defense to sanctions is a complaint
thoroughly grounded on solid investigation. The litigation would be massive and likely to provoke a full retaliatory response, including counterclaims, because of what is at stake. If an injunction were granted, a court
might order a bond to be posted.8 1 The need for a bond is questionable,
however, given that an injunction would only direct that transfer prices
have an economic, not tax, justification. Japan Inc. would be hard
pressed to claim the need for a bond, when the injunction merely ordered
it not to evade taxes.
Litigation would occur in a highly charged political context. Japan
Inc., using its considerable lobbying resources in Washington,8 2 is likely
to pressure the Department of Justice and the IRS not to cooperate with
the suit or actively interfere with its progress. The Department of State
would be likely to object to a RICO suit as interference with foreign
policy objectives. Free trade advocates who would view this as a diplomatic rather than a business problem would also likely attempt to prevail. If successful, their efforts would be evident in the absence of overt
government cooperation with any RICO action.
The free trade advocates make the faulty assumption that corporate
Japan is a trading partner. It is not. Trade implies reciprocity and give-

79. Opinion apparently diverges on whether injunctive relief is available under
RICO or through a federal court's general equitable powers. Compare Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (equitable power), affd on
other grounds, 730 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984) and In re Fredeman Litigation, 843 F.2d
821 (5th Cir. 1988) (RICO statutory authority) with Religious Technology Center v.
Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1080-89 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103

(1987) (holding that RICO's legislative intent does not permit the granting of equitable
relief). Federal courts also retain the power to enjoin the commission of a crime. In re

Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 593 (1895).
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
81.

See, e.g.,

FED.

R. Civ. P. 65(c); Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665, 675 (2d Cir.

1961).
82. See

chs. 4, 5 (1990); John B. Judis, The
Jan. 22, 1990, at 20, 22.

PAT CHOATE, AGENTS OF INFLUENCE,

JapaneseMegaphone, THE NEW

REPUBLIC,
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and-take, concepts that trade deficit figures show are nearly absent in
United States-Japan business. Responding to predatory practices with
the concept of free trade is like regarding freedom as an adequate response to aggression. If government chooses not to intervene, then it
should allow the private sector to present its best case. This requires
some form of cooperation.

Because of political overtones, the choice of venue may be as critical as
would be the choice of courts. 8 State courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over civil RICO cases, which means that such cases may be brought in
state, as well as in federal court. 4 Many states have their own civil
RICO statutes. 5 The state court option should not be overlooked since
local courts and juries would probably be more responsive to localized
economic conditions and less concerned with international politics.
XI.

THE COLOR TELEVISION CASES

Any RICO action must take into account the political context in
which it would occur. Prior experience shows that Japan Inc. has no
reservation about using political clout when its interests are threatened
by litigation. In the early 1980s American television manufacturers led
by Zenith unsuccessfully used the antitrust laws to try to block what
they saw as a conspiracy by Japanese firms to drive them out of business. Allegedly, the Japanese did this by selling television sets in Japan
at artificially high prices and then using the profits to finance the sale of
televisions at artificially low prices in the United States. In its brief to
the United States Supreme Court in the antitrust case, the Japanese government admitted imposing controls on the exportation of Japanese
goods, which the American TV industry alleged were unlawful.86 The
Justice Department intervened and actually supported the Japanese position that its companies merely observed Japanese government regulations limiting the price, quantity, and other conditions of export from
Japan to foreign markets. This is known as the "foreign sovereign compulsion defense." The Justice Department found that there was "no evidence of concerted predatory conduct intended to destroy 'and supplant

83. A RICO action may be brought in any district in which a defendant "resides, is
found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(a).
84. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
85. New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, Washington, and Illinois are among those states
with their own civil RICO statutes. Blakey & Perry, supra note 56, at 988-1011 (detailing in chart form federal and state RICO legislation).
86. Brief of the Gov't of Japan at 3, Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs File.
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the [United States] color TV industry," and that
the "simple economic
87
illogic" of such a plan disproved its existence.
The Supreme Court, in a five to four vote, accepted the Justice Department's "economic illogic' theory,8 s but not before hearing the position of the government of Japan in a related dumping case.89 The Court
did not decide the "foreign sovereign compulsion defense" issue. In the

related dumping case, the United States Solicitor General presented to
the Court, at the request of the State Department, a letter that
originated from the Japanese government. The letter warned that a decision against Japan's interests would damage United States-Japan trade
and "adversely affect world trade generally." 90 The submission of this
letter was so far out of line that Justice Blackmun asked the Solicitor
General whether the letter was "a threat to this Court" and whether he
was doing his "best to uphold the position espoused by the government
of Japan."91
In retrospect, the Justice Department position supporting Japan Inc.
would be merely quaint and dated, were it not for the resulting destruction of the American color television industry. Zenith remains the only
major United States based firm producing color televisions, maintaining
only one television and one picture tube plant in the nation.9 2 The bulk
of Zenith's television manufacturing now occurs in Mexico."
The high-powered lobbying apparent in the television cases may be in
the process of being repeated. United States Customs Service auditors
reportedly have concluded that Honda owed about 20 million dollars in
tariffs on 1989 and 1990 model cars imported into the United States
from Canada. 9 ' Although these cars could be imported duty-free provided that at least half of the value added to them originated in North

87. Brief for the United States at 18, Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs File.
88. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
89. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
90. CHOATE, supra note 82, at 93.
91. Id. at 93-94. In the related dumping case, United States television manufacturers
also lost by unanimous vote in their attempt to force the Department of Treasury to
collect 382 million dollars in assessed, but uncollected, duties on imported color televisions. Presumably after much lobbying, Japanese companies paid only 16 million dollars.

Id. at 97.
92. GRAHAM &
93. Id.

KRUGMAN,supra note

29, at 52-53.

94. The United States Customs Service denied the author's Freedom of Information
Act request for the Honda audit report and a memorandum of the Customs Commis-"
sioner approving their findings. Although the author appealed the decision, the United
States Customs Service affirmed its original decision on February 4, 1992.
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America, customs auditors concluded the actual North American content
was only forty percent. The Customs Commissioner originally decided to
initiate collection action on the tariff, then concluded that the matter
needed further investigation after a visit from Honda's attorney, a former Treasury Department general counsel, 95 then finally upheld the ini-

tial findings of Customs auditors.96 Japan's minister of International
Trade and Industry characterized Custom's action as "discrimination
against a Japanese company."9" Honda has announced its intention to

appeal.
RICO could neutralize Japan Inc.'s political operatives. Given the
RICO statute's purposefully broad scope, it appears unlikely that the
foreign sovereign compulsion defense could defeat a RICO action premised on tax evasion. The counterargument is simple; the direction of a
foreign government is no defense to tax evasion. 98
XII.

CONCLUSION

Evidence of tax-dodging by Japanese controlled corporations through
transfer pricing techniques is compelling. Billions in tax revenues have
been lost. American business has also paid a price. All that is left to do is
a case-by-case analysis to fix individual responsibility. RICO's "wellaimed light" should be able to do that.
Someone else will argue later-it is sure to be an American lawyer-that what I propose is no solution at all, and nothing more than a
lawyer's proscription for high-intensity conflict. To the contrary, this is a
battle that should be fought to begin to change the order of things. Even
95. Paul Magnusson et al.,
Honda Is It An American Car?, Bus. WK., Nov. 18,
1991, at 108.
96. Robert Pear, Duties Set on Honda Over Parts, N.Y. TIM s, Mar. 3, 1992, at
Dl.
97. U.S. Move on Honda Triggers Complaints by Japanese Official, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 4, 1992, at 6.
98. In a true assertion of the foreign sovereign compulsion defense, a defendant admits its own conduct has been unlawful, but argues that dismissal is warranted because a
foreign government compelled the unlawful conduct. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3rd Cir. 1979); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco
Maracaibo, 307 F. Supp. 1292, 1297-98 (D. Del. 1970). Essentially, courts are asked to
abstain from exercising jurisdiction, a dubious prospect for private litigants in light of
recent Supreme Court decisions. W.S. Kilpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (Act of state doctrine did not bar RICO action predicated
upon the payment of bribes to a foreign official to secure the award of a foreign government contract); New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989)
("federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has
been conferred").
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the general media are beginning to press to "get on with the struggle
where there is no way out ... [when] the Japanese system is being used
deliberately against us."9 The alternative to decisive action is Americathe-Warehouse or, at best, "Japan's subcontractor," as the Speaker of
Japan's lower house of Parliament predicted recently.100 This is also a
battle which "the [United States] government is very unlikely" to join, at
least with respect to the automotive industry, notwithstanding the downside domestic political risk in such an abdication. 0 1 Realpolitik aside,
government should support a private sector RICO initiative because it is
premised upon countering unlawful business methods, while respecting
the views of both protectionist and free market advocates.
The problem will not simply go away. Economists Graham and Krugman conclude that the insular trade practices of Japan, Inc., including a
propensity to source heavily from outside the United States, will be a
"source of tension . . . for a long time to come." 10 2 Japan Inc.'s "eco-

nomic nationalism" is coherent and directional, not open-ended, and is
driven by a logic that defines the end-game as dominance, not
mutuality.10 3
More is at stake than mere dollars. The fight concerns the hearts and
minds of the American consumer and whether product image and consumer preference will be affected by allegations of tax cheating in tough
economic times. The point of decision finally will occur, as it should, in
the marketplace, not in the courtroom.
RICO should be considered only as a last resort to counter keiretsu
conduct that violates United States law. In his controversial book, The
Enigma ofJapanese Power, Karel van Wolferen argues that corporate
Japan will continue its practice of adversarial trade premised on boeki
masatsu, or trade friction, until "angry outsiders resort to coercion" to
force them to change their ways.1 0 He is not alone in this view. Kozo
Yamamura, professor of Japanese studies at the University of Washington, believes that Japanese firms "must be forced or induced" to undermine their belief in the "economic rationality" of their keiretsu mode if

99. A.M. Rosenthal, PresentingHypocrisy Inc., N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1992, at A15.
100. A Top JapanesePoliticianCalls U.S. Work Force Lazy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1992, at Dl.
101. McALINDEN, supra note 27, at 77.
102. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 29, at 148, 160.
103. These observations are simply an application in a limited context of the thesis
that history has an end-point. FRANcis FUKUYAMA, The End of History and the Last
Man, Part 11 (1992).
104. KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, The Enigma of Japanese Power 6, 49 (1990).
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they are to become more open to competition. 10 5 RICO could certainly
do that.
United States business seems ever the compliant victim. Whether it be
corporate Japan or unscrupulous junk bond promoters and takeover artists, or government regulation (too much or too little), someone else always seems to be to blame for business setbacks. Because the root of the
problem lies elsewhere, so it seems to American business does the
solution.
Yet, RICO is available now for those with the will to act. As they
think about it, market share continues to shrink and RICO's four year
statute of limitations ticks away.

105.

Yamamura, supra note 10, at 51.

